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Residential Mortgages as Financial Assets and
Liabilities
Mortgage Debt Outstanding
POSITION OF MORTGAGES AMONG ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
RESIDENTIAL mortgages play a much smaller role among intangible
assets and liabilities than housing among tangible assets. In 1958, at
their highest level in sixty years, nonfarm residential mortgages were
only 6½ per cent of all financial assets and 9 per cent of liabilities
(Table 74). Adding mortgage debt on agricultural residences would
increase these figures only very little, because the debt-to-value ratio on
agricultural real estate is low, and most of the value of agricultural
real estate is land, which we assume to be nonresidential.'
In 1929-83 and the late 1950's residential mortgages formed a larger
part of intangible assets and liabilities than in earlier years back to 1900
(Table 74). This impression of an upward trend is reinforced by the
suggestion of Grebler, Blank, and Winnick that early mortgage levels
were overstated.2 But the swings in the ratio are so wide that it is diffi-
cult to speak confidently of a trend, particularly since the 1933 ratios
were quite similar to all but the highest of those of the 1950's.
If residential mortgages are compared with liabilities other than
those of the federal government, there is more indication of a long-term
rise in importance. The recent levels, in particular, are clearly higher
than those of the 1930's. The trend is still stronger if comparison is
made with corporate debt. The share of residential mortgages in the
total of mortgage and long-term corporate debt rose from 16 per cent
in 1900 to over 40 per cent in the early 1950's.3
At the time of the earliest national balance sheet, in 1900, nonfarm
residential mortgage debt accounted for less than half of all mortgages;
but by 1958 their share had risen to more than three-quarters. Most of
this gain was at the expense of farm mortgages, which were mainly on
nonresidential property, but residential mortgages also grew faster than
nonfarm nonresidential mortgage debt.
'There are no published figures on farm residential mortgage debt because farm
mortgages typically cover the farm as a whole. But a rough estimate can be made
by assuming tha•t the ratio of farm residential to total farm. mortgage debt is equal
to the ratio of the value of farm residential structures to the value of total farm
structures and land.
Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Resi-
dential Real Estate, Princeton for NBER, 1956, pp. 168-169.
3lbid., pp. 166-167, 450.
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TABLE 74
SHARE OF NONFARMRESIDENTIALMORTGAGES IN NATIONAL
ASSETS ANDLIABILITIES,1900-58
(per cent)
Total Total Liabilities Total
Intangible Total cxc. Federal Mortgage
Assets Liabilities Government Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1900 4.3 6.6 6.8 43.6
1912 3.5 5.5 5.6 41.6
1922 3.4 5.1 5.8 40.4
1929 4.5 '7.9 8.4 53.6
1933 5.2 7.7 8.6 55.2
1939 4.3 6.0 7.2 58.7
1945A 2.4 3.1 5.0 65.7
1945B 2.4 3.0 4.7 65.5
1946 2.9 3.6 5.5 67.3
1947 3.3 4.1 6.1 69.0
1948 3.7 4.6 6.7 70.5
1949 4.0 5.1 7.3 71.6
1950 4.4 5.7 7.9 73.6
1951 4.7 6.1 8.3 74.6
1952 4.9 6.4 8.7 75.3
1953 5.3 6.8 9.1 76.1
1954 5.5 7.3 9.7 76.7
1955 5.7 7.9 10.2 77.4
1956 6.1 8.3 10.6 77.5
1957 6.4 8.6 10.9 77.4
1958 6.4 8.9 11.2 77.4
SouRcE: 1900-45A: Vol. II, Table Ia.
1945B58: Vol. II, Table I.
The wide fluctuations in the importance of residential mortgage
debt seem to have been related to the rate of building. The share of
residential mortgages increased in both the postwar building booms, to
a much greater extent than the ratio of housing to total tangible assets.
As will be seen later, the share of residential mortgages moved similarly
to the debt-to-value ratio for housing, increasing rapidly in the 1920's,
reaching a peak in 1933 and a very low point after World War II, and
then rising rapidly and uninterruptedly to the highest recorded level in
1958.
Although mortgages are held by most sectors, they are of major im-
portance only to the portfolios of the finance sector where they have
moved from 8 per cent in 1900 to a low of 4.6 per cent in 1945 and to
over 16 per cent in 1958 (Table 75). Even within the finance sector,
only a few groups hold a large part of their assets in mortgages. Savings
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TABLE 75




Corn-Mutualand Loan Life NonfarmFederal
mercialSavingsAssoci-Insurance House-Govern-
TotalBanksBanksaationsCompanies OtherTotalholds ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1900 8.0 1.9 21.8 75.7 10.5 3.2 1.1 2.6 —
1912 8.7 2.7 26.4 89.0 10.6 8.3 .7 1.6 —
1922 8.2 2.7 27.5 88.1 9.1 2.1 .8 1.6 —
1929 12.4 5.1 35.6 83.4 15.5 2.0 1.0 1.9 —
1933 12.7 6.6 38.4 71.8 12.6 1.3 1.2 2.8 1.0
1939 7.4 4.3 26.9 69.7 8.7 .6 1.2 1.6 8.5
1945A 4.5 2.2 16.5 60.0 8.1 .2 .7 1.1 1.1
1945B 4.6 2.1 19.9 60.2 8.2 .3 .6 1.0 1.1
1946 5.7 3.4 19.1 68.3 8.3 .4 .6 1.0 1.1
1947 6.7 4.4 19.9 74.0 9.7 .5 .6 1.0 .9
1948 7.7 5.1 23.0 77.3 12.1 .5 .6 1.0 .9
1949 8.6 5.4 25.5 77.3 13.9 .6 .6 1.0 1.6
1950 10.0 6.1 31.0 78.7 17.1 .9 .6 .9 1.7
1951 10.8 6.2 36.3 79.0 19.8 .8 .6 .9 2.1
1952 11.4 6.3 38.8 79.1 20.3 .9 .6 .9 2.5
1953 12.3 6.6 41.4 80.1 20.9 1.0 .6 .9 2.8
1954 13.2 6.9 44.7 .80.5 21.7 1.1 .6 .8 2.8
1955 14.4 7.4 49.3 81.3 23.1 1.3 .6 .8 2.9
1956 15.3 7.7 52.6 81.2 24.4 1.3 .6 .8 3.3
1957 15.7 7.5 53.6 80.9 24.3 1.2 .6 .8 4.4
1959 16.1 7.6 55.0 80.7 23.8 1.4 .6 .8 4.4
SOURCE: 1900.45A, cols. 1, 7-9:Vol. II, Table Ia; cols. 2-6: Mortgages from Vol. II,
Table IV-b-llc-1. Total assets from R. W. Goldsmith, A Study
of Saving in the United States, Princeton, 1955, Vol. I, Tables
L-24, L-29, J-2, j-6, and I-S.
1945B-58: Vol. II, Tables I and II.
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (Capital Formation) give higher estimates: 1900—.
26.0, 1912—31.5, 1922—32.8, 1929—41.9, 1933—39.9, 1939—32.7, and 1945—19.9.
and loan associations are the most specialized in this direction (aside
from mortgage companies which are primarily dealers in mortgages
rather than holders), followed by mutual savings banks, life insurance
companies, and commercial banks.
The pattern of changes in the ratio of nonfarm residential mortgages
to total assets for the finance group as a whole was repeated in several
components. There was an increase in importance from 1900 to 1929,
particularly in the 1920's, except for savings and loan associations,
and a further rise until 1933 in one case. Thiswas followed by a col-
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lapse to exceptionally low levels by the end of World War II, and then
renewed growth until the earlier peaks had been far surpassed.
Savings and loan associations were an exception to this pattern. They
exist primarily for the financing of homes, and have always been highly
specialized, but their concentration on nonfarm residential mortgages
in 1912-29, approximately 88 per cent, has never been reached again
since the war. However, commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and
life insurance companies have all sharply increased the role of mort-
gages among their assets since World War
The share of residential mortgages in the assets of nonfinancial sec-
tors, always small, was sharply reduced during World War II and never
recovered. A similar pattern of changes applies to the holdings of non-
farm households. The federal government, however, had a large pro-
portion of its 'assets in mortgages in the 1930's, mainly owned by the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation. A large part of these was liquidated
during and after the war, and the proportion was also cut by the great
rise in total federal government assets. Since 1948 the proportion has
been growing again, mainly as a result of purchases by the Federal
National Mortgage Association. It reached 4.4 per cent in 1958 and
has probably gone above 6 per cent since then.
Since 1935 the mortgage market has been made up of two distinct
types of claims; government-insured or government-guaranteed mort-
gages, and conventional mortgages. The former have some of the safety
of government securities and wider geographical markets than conven-
tional mortgages.5
After the war, the finance sector raised the share of its assets held in
both conventional and government-insured mortgages, the latter more
rapidly (Table 76). The different types of lending institutions did not
all react in the same way. Commercial banks distributed their net addi-
tions and holdings about equally between the two types, whereas mutual
savings banks, which were overwhelmingly in conventional mortgages
before the war, held these at about 18 per cent of their assets while
bringing FHA and VA mortgages up from 2 to almost 37 per cent.
Savings and loan associations were the only group whose portfolio re-
'For data on and a fuller discussion of long-term trends in the importance of
mortgages in the portfolios of financial institutions see, Grebler, Blank, and Win-
nick, Capital Formation, pp. 195-204, arid J. E. Mortori, Urban Mortgage Lending:
Comparative Markets and Experience, Princeton for NBER, 1956, pp. 54-60.
The relations among the growth of federal mortgage guarantee programs, the
development of mortgage companies, and the postwar shift in investments by mutual
savings banks and life insurance companies are discussed in Saul B. lUaman, The
Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, NBER Occasional Paper 60, New York, 1959.
5Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (Capital Formation, pp. 242-245 and 249-250)
describetheplace of government-insured loans in total mortgage, debt since the
inception of the program.
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TABLE 76
SHARES OF GUARANTEED AND MORTGAGES IN TOTAL AssErs OF
FouR MAIN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 1945-58
(per cent)
Vol.II.Total assets fromTablesIII-5c, III5d, III-5e, and III-5h. Mort-
gages fromTablesIV-blla-3 throughIV-b-lla-6.
mained heavily weighted with conventional mortgages—54 per cent of
total assets in 1945 and 64 per cent in 1958. The share of FHA and VA
mortgages did, however, more than double over this period. Life in-
surance companies took an intermediate position. They increased the
share of their assets held in conventional mortgages from 5 to 10 per
cent, but never brought it up to prewar levels, and they raised their
holdings of FHA and VA mortgages fromto 14 per cent of assets.
Guaranteed and conventional mortgages grew in importance at
different times. Commercial banks and life insurance companies in-
creased the share of government-guaranteed mortgages in their port-
folios very rapidly until 1950 or 1951—more rapidly than that of con-
ventional mortgages. But after that, the importance of guaranteed
mortgages hardly grew at all, while that of conventional mortgages con-
tinued to rise. In the case of mutual savings banks, virtually all of the
growth in mortgages was in guaranteed ones; it was most rapid before
1951 but continued at a brisk pace even after that. Savings and loan
associations, after more than tripling the share of FHA and VA mort-
gages (mairdy the latter) in their total assets in the late 194Q's while
281
Guaranteed -Insured and
VA -Guaranteed) Mortgages Conventional Mortgages
Four SavingsLifeFour SavingsLife
MainCorn-Mutual and LoanInsur-MainCorn-Mutual and LoanInsur-
Insti-mercial SavingsAssod-anceInsti-merdal Savings Assod.ance
tutions BanksBanksations Cos.tutionsBanksBanksations Cos.
1945 1.7 1.0 2.1 6.3 3.1 5.2 1.1 17.8 53.8 5.2
1946 2.5 1.5 2.7 13.6 3.1 6.2 1.9 16.4 54.6 5.2
1947 3.7 2.2 4.1 21.0 4.3 6.6 2.3 15.8 53.0 5.4
1948 4.9 2.7 6.6 22.6 6.2 7.2 2.5 16.3 54.6 5.9
1949 5.7 3.0 9.1 22.4 7.7 7.5 2.5 16.4 54.9 6.1
1950 7.0 3.8 13.5 22.5 10.2 8.3 2.7 17.5 56.2 6.9
1951 7.8 3.5 18.1 20.7 12.2 8.8 2.7 18.2 58.3 7.6
1952 8.1 3.5 21.2 18.9 12.2 9.5 2.9 17.6 60.3 8.1
1953 8.5 33 23.9 18.7 12.1 10.4 3.0 17.5 61.4 8.8
1954 9.1 8.6 27.3 18.5 12,6 11.2 3.3 17.4 62.0 9.1
1955 10.1 3.8 31.4 19.2 13.6 12.1 8.5 17.9 62.0 93
1956 10.7 3.9 34.3 18.8 14.3 13.0 8.7 18.3 62.3 10.1
1957 10.7 3.7 35.1 17.9 14.1 13.7 3.8 18.5 63.1 10.2
1958 10.5 3.6 36.4 16.7 18.7 14.3 4.0 18.6 65.9 10.2HOUSING IN THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET
keeping the share of conventional mortgages constant, shifted back to
the latter in the 1950's.
On the whole it can be said that the increase in importance of guar-
anteed mortgages had almost stopped by 1951. Only mutual savings
banks, which had previously been prevented from satisfying their
appetite for them, continued to raise the share of guaranteed mort-
gages in their total assets.0
The sectoral breakdown of mortgage liabilities, like that of housing
described in Chapter 10, is based on slight evidence and must therefore
be used with caution. The levels of the postwar data are based on the
single benchmark of the 1950 Housing Census and upon the fact that
one- to four-family housing is very largely owned by households.
Residential mortgage debt has always occupied a larger place in the
liabilities of nonfarm households than of any other major sector
(Table 77). At every benchmark since 1900 except one, its share was
at least 46 per cent of total liabilities. The exception was 1929, when
loans on securities were particularly high. In every year since the war,
residential mortgage debt has been more than 60 per cent of household
liabilities. Most of the data, with the exception of the high figure for
1900, point to a long-term rise in the importance of mortgages among
household liabilities. It is probably not as great as suggested by the
ratios—--the 1945 overlap indicates some understatement in the earlier
data relative to the later estimates.
For both corporate and nonfarm unincorporated business, the im-
portance of residential mortgage debt in liabilities rose greatly between
1900 and the 19S0's, reflecting the growth of multifamily housing. It
appears, from the two 1945 estimates, that the growth before the war
may have been exaggerated by the estimation procedure. After World
War II there was a decline in the unincorporated business ratios, while
those for corporations held quite steady, partly because some one- to
four-family mortgage debt was allocated to corporations and partly
because there was a shift of multifamily debt from unincorporated to
corporate business.
THE COMPOSITION OF MORTGAGE PORTFOLIOS
If attention is concentrated on the composition of the mortgage port-
folio itself, two trends stand out (Table 78). One, starting at the be-
ginning of the century, is the threefold rise in the importance of multi-
family mortgages from 10 to 24 and 27 per cent in 1929 and 1933 and
the subsequent decline almost to the initial level. The other, a postwar
phenomenon, is the growth of guaranteed mortgages from 19 to over
40 per cent, mainly between 1945 and 1950 or 1951.
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1900 57.5 5.8 0.6
1912 47.8 10.0 0.8
1922 46.0 14.3 1.8
1929 43.0 20.1 8.7
1933 49.7 24.8 4.4
1989 51.8 21.1 5.0
1945A 55.5 18.1 4.4
1945B 59.8 13.8 8.8
1946 63.0 12.2 4.1
1947 62.7 10.8 4.2
1948 62.7 10.9 4.4
1949 61.6 11.6 5.1
1950 60.9 10.7 5.2
1951 63.1 12.0 5.1
1952 62.2 11.7 5.2
1953 62.2 113 5.3
1954 63.7 10.5 5.4
1955 63.2 9.8 5.2
1956 64.1 9.4 4.9
1957 64.7 9.3. 4.8
1958 65.9 9.3 5.1
SOURCE: 1900-45A: Total liabilities from Vol. II, Table Ia. Mortgage debt from
Vol. II, Table IV-c.lle-1, lines 11, 12, 15, and 16.
1945B-58: Total liabilities from Vol. II, Table I. Mortgage debt from
Vol. II, Tables IV-c-lla and IV-c-lIb.
The importance of multifamily debt in the mortgage holdings of
life insurance companies, mutual savings banks, commercial banks, and
other investors, reached peaks in the 1920's or 1930's.7 In each case the
share of multifamily mortgages at least doubled between 1900 and
1920 and at some point before 1939 was a third of total holdings of
nonf arm residential mortgages. Then there was a shift back toward
home mortgages; the next thirteen years saw the institutions continuing
to reduce the proportion of multifamily debt in their mortgage port-
folios until by 1958 it was almost down to the level of the beginning
of the century.8
The postwar switch from conventional to guaranteed mortgages took
place within multifamilyand one- to four-family debt and was not just
Goldsmith,A Study of Saving, Vol. I, Tables M-5, M-6, M-9, and M-10.
8Vol. II, Tables IV-blla and IV-b-lla-l. See also J. E. Morton, Urban Mortgage
Lending,pp. 16-18.
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TABLE 78








Total tional FHA Total tionaland VA tionaland VA
1900 10.0 10.0 90.0 90.0 100.0
1912 16.0 16.0 84.0 84.0 100.0
1922 21.8 21.8 78.2 78.2 ioo.o
1929 24.1 24.1 75.9 75.9 100.0
1933 271 27.1 72.9 72.9 100.0
1939 21.6 21.1 0.5 78.4 70.0 8.4 91.1 8.9
1945A 20.2 19.1 1.1 79.8 61.4 18.4 80.5 19.5
1945B 20.1 19.1 1.0 79.9 61.5 18.4 80.6 19.4
1946 18.0 17.3 0.8 82.0 60.3 21.7 77.5 22.5
1947 16.5 14.8 1.6 83.5 56.0 273 70.8 29.1
1948 16.0 13.1 2.9 84.0 52.5 31.5 65.6 34.4
1949 16.2 11.4 4.8 83.8 50.4 33.4 61.8 38.2
1950 15.7 9.7 6.0 84.3 49.1 35.2 58.8 41.2
1951 15.8 9.7 6.0 84.2 47.0 37.3 56.7 43.3
1952 15.1 9.4 5.7 84.9 48.1 36.8 57.5 42.5
1953 14.3 9.1 5.2 85.7 49.8 36.4 58.4 41.6
1954 13.2 83 4.7 86.8 50.0 36.8 58.5 41.5
1955 12.3 8.3 4.0 87.7 49.0 38.7 57.8 42.7
1956 11.7 8.2 8.5 88.3 49.2 39.2 57.4 42.7
1957 11.3 7.7 8.6 88.7 49.8 38.9 57.5 42.5
1958 113 7.8 3.8 88.5 50.8 37.7 58.6 41.5
1959 11.6 7.9 3.7 88.4 52.0 36.4 60.0 40.1
1960 11.8 8.2 3.7 88.2 52.9 35.2 61.1 38.9
SOURCE: 1900-45A: FHA mortgages, Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, Capital Forma-
tion, p. 243. VA mortgages, Housing Statistics, April 1962, p. 60.
Total mortgages, Vol. II, Tables IV-b-llc-1 through IV-b-llc-5.
1945B-60: Vol. II, Tables IVb-lIa through IV-b.lla-6. These were based
mainly on estimates by Kiaman (Volume of Mortgage Debt)
and have been carried through 1960 using the methods de-
scribed there.
a reflection of the decline in the former. Even while total multifamily
mortgages were falling from 20 to 16 per cent of all mortgages between
1945 and 1951, FHA-insured multifamily mortgages rose from 1 to 6
per cent. After that they declined even faster than conventional mort-
gages but were still almost a third of all multifamily mortgages in 1960.
The rise from 80 to 84 per cent between 1945 and 1951 in the share
of one- to four-family mortgages in the total nonf arm residential mort-
gage debt was made up of a fall in the conventional share from 61.5 to
47 per cent and a doubling of the guaranteed share which began at
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18.4 per cent. Thereafter the conventional mortgages regained some
of the lost ground and again reached more than half of outstanding
home mortgages.
Switching into guaranteed mortgages took place mainly before 1951
for every institution except the mutual savings banks. With the same
exception, there was then some shifting back into conventional mort-
gages.9 All three of the institutions holding substantial portions of
their mortgage portfolios in multifamily debt reduced that share.
Only during the first few years, and only partially even then, were re-
ductions in the share of conventional mortgages offset by increases in
guaranteed multifamily mortgages.
Savings and loan associations owned virtually no multifamily mort-
gages. The most marked feature of their distribution, aside from the
fact that they have remained heavily concentrated in conventional
mortgages, was the sharp shift from conventional to guaranteed mort-
gages in 1945-47 and the drift back to conventional since 1948.
Commercial banks increased the share of one- to four-family guaran-
teed mortgages rapidly between 1945 and 1949, mainly by reducing
the importance of multifamily holdings. After 1951, however, they
began shifting back to conventional home mortgages, first by reducing
the share of FHA multifamily and then, after 1956, by sharply cutting
down the share of guaranteed home mortgages.
Life insurance companies raised their guaranteed one- to four-
family mortgages from 34 to more than 50 per cent between 1945 and
1951, decreasing the share of conventional home mortgages slightly,
but reducing that of conventional multifamily debt from 34 to about
15 per cent. Since 1951 they have substituted conventional home mort-
gages for multifamily debt.
Mutual savings banks were the only group that increased its empha-
sis on guaranteed mortgages constantly throughout the period. They
did this through parallel reductions in conventional home and multi-
family mortgages from a total of 90 per cent of their mortgage port-
folio in 1945 to only a third in 1960. Until 1952 both home and
multifamily guaranteed mortgages increased their share in total hold-
ings; after that, multifamily guaranteed and conventional mortgages
receded. The rate of change in the composition of mortgage holdings
has slowed greatly since 1956.
For one date, August 1950, some further information is available
from the Housing Census on the composition of mortgage portfolios
(Table 79). The division between one- to four-family and multifamily
°Mortgageinvestment policies of the various financial institutions during the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mortgages in this source agrees fairly well, although not perfectly, with
that shown in Table 78.
Of the 83 per cent of nonfarm residential mortgages which were on
one- to four-family properties (84 per cent in Table 78), 76 per cent
were on owner-occupied and 7.5 per cent were on rental properties.
Slightly less than 70 per cent of total nonfarm residential mortgage
debt is on owner-occupied housing (or dwelling units), if account is
taken of the fact that owner-occupied two- to four-unit properties are
partly rented. Despite the fact that one- to four-family structures ac-
counted for more than two-thirds of the value of rental units (Table
69), multifamily properties carried more than two-thirds of the rental
housing mortgage debt.
Since most of rental housing debt is on multifamily properties, the
institutions which invested heavily in the latter, such as mutual savings
banks and life insurance companies, were the ones with a high pro-
portion of their mortgage investments in rental properties. But there
was considerable variation within the structure and tenure types.
Within one- to four-family mortgages, for example, mutual savings
banks, savings and loan associations, and individuals put between a
fifth and a quarter of their investment into mortgages on two- to four-
unit properties while life insurance companies and the FNMA con-
fined themselves almost entirely to single-family structures. Individuals
also had a much larger part of their one- to four-family mortgage hold-
ings in rental property mortgages than any of the other investors except
the "other" dass.
The distribution of rental property mortgages differed very widely
among institutions. Mutual savings banks, life insurance companies,
and mortgage companies concentrated more than three-quarters of
their holdings on multifamily properties while savings and loan associ-
ations and especially the FNMA held mortgages mainly on small rental
properties. Individuals had almost half their rental housing mortgages
in five- to forty-nine-unit properties but virtually none in the larger
structures.10
DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES AMONG INVESTORS
The outstanding trend in the ownership of mortgage debt over the
past sixty years has been its institutionalization. In 1900 more than
half of the outstanding one- to four-family residential mortgage debt
was held outside of the main lending institutions, almost entirely by
individuals (Table 80). By 1958 the holdings of the nonfarm house-
onother aspects of the composition of mortgage holdings by type, from the
NBER survey of urban mortgage lending, appear in Morton, Urban Mortgage
Lending. pp. 73-75.
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TABLE 80
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY AND
MULTIFAMILY NONFARM RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE DEBT, BY TYPE OF INVESTOR, 1900-60
Corn- MutualSavings and Life Federal
mercial SavingsLoan Asso-InsuranceGovernment
Banks Banks ciationsCompaniesAgencies Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY MORTGAGES
1900 5.9 16.7 14.0 5.8 57.7
1912 9.8 18.9 20.2 8.3 42.8
1922 8.6 13.7 28.5 5.8 48.5
1929 11.7 12.1 32.7 84.9
1933 12.4 15.3 29.1 10.4 0.9 31.9
1989 13.0 13.0 22.9 9.1 13.4 28.5
1945A 15.5 10.2 27.8 12.4 4.6 29.6
1945B 15.4 10.2 27.7 12.4 4.8 29.4
1950 2O.8 9.5 29.0 18.8 8.2 18.6
1955 16.9 12.6 34.0 0.0 3.4 13.1
1958 14.8 18.3 36.4 19.0 3.9 12.4
1960 13.6 13.6 39.2 17.6 5.0 11.5
MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGES
1900 12.9 28.5 10.2 48.5
1912 23.4 83.0 15.1 28.4
1922 23.1 25.7 11.6 89.5
1929 18.4 20.5' 18.0 43.1'
1933 13.5 21.8' 18.0 46.8'
1939 15.2 23.5' 23.7 37.5'
1945A 13.4 19.4' 29.2 88.0'
1945B 11.0 31.9 2.4 29.9 0.2 24.6
1950 11.2 32.5 8.2 81.0 0.8 21.8
1955 6.5 36.1 6.3 28.7 2.4 19.9
1958 6.2 34.5 11.9 23.1 3.4 20.9
1960 5.9 31.8 18.4 20.4 4.7 19.4
SOURCE: Vol. II, Tables IV-b-lla-1, IV-b-Ila-2, IV-b-llc-2, and IV-b-lIc-8, Esti-
mates for postwar years are based mainly on Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt,
Tables 5 and 6, and have been continued by the methods described there.
'Substitution of estimates from Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, Capital Formation,
Table N-6, pp. 478 and 479, would yield the following figures for cols. 2 and 6:






hold sector had dwindled to less than 10 per cent.'1 The four major
mortgage lenders—commercial and mutual savings banks, savings and
loan associations, and life insurance companies—increased their share
from 42 per cent in 1900 to 84 per cent in 1960.12
Withinthe growing institutional share of home mortgage holdings,
there were substantial shifts among the four main lenders. All except
mutual savings banks increased their shares between 1900 and 1960.
Commercialbaniswent into one- to four-family mortgages vigorously
before the war and for a few years after, their share growing through
the late 1940's and then falling. The share of life insurance companies
rose steadily to a peak of 20 per cent in the early 1950's and has de-
dined since then. The mutual savings banks' proportion, highest of all
the lenders' in 1900, fell to less than 10 per cent for several years after
the war and then started to rise just when the commercial banks' share
began declining. Savings and loan associations have been the leading
frequently owning twice the share of any other type of institu-
tion. By 1960 they held almost 40 per cent of the home mortgage debt.
The history of the financing of multifamily mortgage debt is not as
dear because there are considerable differences among estimates of in-
stitutions' holdings. But both the sources mentioned in Table 80
agree that noninstitutional holdings dwindled in importance between
1988 and 1960.18 The role of commercial banks was at .its peak very
early, just before and after World War I, when they held almost a
quarter of the multifamily debt; now their share is below 6 per cent.
Life insurance companies increased their share until 1950 and then
cut it back. The postwar years have seen the growth of two new
sources of financing: savings and loan associations, whose share jumped
from 2 to 18 per cent,'4 and the federal government, which rose to 5
per cent.
For both types of mortgages, the early 1950's were a turning point,
marking the beginning of a decline in participation by commercial
banks and insurance companies and a rise in the importance of the
two main savings
11Vo1. II, Table IV-b-lla-2.
12SeeGrebler, Blank, andWinnick,Capital Formation, pp.192if., for a discu8-
sion of some of the reasons for this shift in ownership. One of these, the ineligi-
bility of noninstitutional lenders under the FHA program, has since been removed.
13Grebler,. Blank, and Winnick suggest, furthermore, that the estimating pro-
cedure understates the shifttoinstitutional ownership of mortgages(Capital
Formation, p. 192).
14 risein the value of savings and loan association holdings of multifamily
mortgages appears suspiciously rapid. Since the method of estimation is indirect, it
is possible that part of the rise may result from an understatement of the growth
of nonresidential mortgages, which have been assumed to form a constant part of
the mortgage portfolio. See Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Table 16.
The history of participation in the nonfarm residential mortgage market by
several types of financial institutions is reviewed in Grebler, Blank, and Winnick,HOUSING IN TEE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET
When the postwar mortgage market is subdivided by type of mort-
gage and of structure, new differences in sources of financing appear
(Table 81). Among conventional one- to four-family mortgages, sav-
ings and loan associations established a predominant position, raising
their share to over 50 per cent and replacing "other investors" whose
TABLE 81
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP OF FOUR TYPES OF NONFARM
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE DEBT, BY TYPE OP INVESTOR, 1949-60
1945 1950 1955 1958 1960
ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY
Conventional
1.Commercial banks 9.5 16.3 14.2 13.9 132
2. Mutual savings banks 10.9 7.0 5.6 5.1 4.7
3. Savings and loan assoc. 32.2 35.5 46.1 49.8 52.7
4. Life insurance cos. 7.3 10.5 13.1 12.8 11.8
5. Federal government 6.0 0.2 1.1 1.5 1.9
6. Other 34.1 30.5 19.9 16.8 15.8
FHA and VA
1. Commercial banks 35.2 27.0 20.3 16.0 14.3
2. Mutualsavingsbanks 7.6 13.1 21.4 24.3 25.5
3. Savings and loan assoc. 12.8 20.1 18.7 18.4 18.9
4. Life insurance cos. 29.6 30.8 28.7 27.4 26.4
5. Federal government 0.7 7.5 6.3 7.1 9.8
6. Other 14.1 2.0 4.5 6.7 5.1
MULTIFAMILY
Conventional
1.Commercial banks 11.0 6.7 6.4 2.5 3.7
2. Mutual savings banks 33.1 40.9 84.6 35.2 82.7
3. Savings and loan assoc. 2.4 4.4 9.1 17.2 .26.2
4. Life insurance cos. 28.6 33.0 27.0 23.1 213
5. Federal government 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.9 2.0
6. Other 24.8 14.6 21.4 20.1 13.9
FHA
1. Commercial banks 12.7 18.3 6.8 13.8 10.8
2. Mutualsavingsbanks 9.3 18.8 39.4 38.2 28.2
S. Savings and loan assoc. 2.5 1.1 0.4 1.0 0.9
4. Life insurance cos. 54.4 27.6 32.3 23.1 17.9
5. Federal government — 0.4 4.3 6.4 10.6
6. Other 21.1 83.7 16.8 22.5 31.6
SOURcE: Vol. II, Tables IV-b-lIa-3 through IV-b-lla-6. Based mainly on estimates
by Klaman (Volume of Mortgage Debt) and extended to 1960 by using his methods.
The 1960 figures for commercial banks include small amounts for banks in possessions.
Capital Formation, pp. 194-205, and Morton, Urban Mortgage Lending, pp. 35.39.
See also Raymond J. Saulnier, Urban Mortgage Lending by Life Insurance Com-
panies, New York, NBER, 1950, and Carl F. Behrens, Commercial Bank ActivitIes
in Urban Mortgage Financing, New York, NBER, 1952.
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share was cut by half. Less important declines in mutual savings banks'
and the federal government's shares were taken up by commercial
banks and life insurance companies. Among guaranteed home mort-
gages, it was mainly the commercial banks whose share was cut sharply
while mutual savings banks tripled theirs. Increases were registered
also by savings and loan associations and the federal government,
while "other investors," as in the case of conventional mortgages, lost
ground.
Both commercial banks and other investors declined as holders of
multifamily conventional loans and their places were taken by savings
and loan associations and the federal government. The less important
category of insured multifamily mortgages, of which more than half
was held by life insurance companies in 1945 and less than a quarter in
1958, shifted to a considerable extent to mutual savings banks and the
federal government.
Table 79 again supplies additional information on the structure of
financing. Life insurance companies (45.4 per cent) and mutual sav-
ings banks per cent) almost monopolized mortgages on proper-
ties of fifty or more units. Individuals and savings and loan associations
held 29.5 per cent of loans on properties of five to forty-nine units but
only 4.4 per cent of those on the larger ones.
Debt-to-Asset Ratios for Housing
AGGREGATE DEBT-TO-VALUE RATIOS
Mortgages, unlike most forms of debt, are tied not only to the sectors
whose liabilities they are but also to specific tangible assets. It is true
that funds raised through mortgage debt can be used for purposes
other than housing and that forms of borrowing other than mortgages
can be used for the purchase of houses. But a residential mortgage can-
not be secured without the existence of housing assets and the majority
of real estate transfers involve a flow of mortgage funds. Thus the
matching of housing assets with mortgage liabilities is a more meaning-
ful procedure than most comparisons of assets with specific liabilities.
The proportion of the value of housing covered by mortgage debt
has been higher in the last few years than at any previous time in our
records(Table 82). Similar calculations by Grebler, Blank, and
Winnick1° indicate that they are the highest in a seventy-year period
extending back to 1890, and that even the low point in the ratio after
World War II was considerably higher than some of those before
World War I. Despite the very wide fluctuations, then, there are mdi.
cations of a rising trend in the extent to which housing is mortgaged.
'°CapitalFormation, pp. 167-169 and Appendix Table L-6.
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TABLE 82
RESIDENTIALMORTGAGE AS A PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF





Sectors House-porated Corpo- 1- to 4- Multi-
holds Businessa Familyb familyb








1945B 14.6 12.8 18.3 40.6 12.8 32.1
1946 15.0 13.4 17.0 40.9 13.5 30.7
1947 14.8 13.4 15.3 40.4 13.6 28.6
1948 16.1 14.7 15.3 40.6 14.8 29.5
1949 18.4 16.9 16.8 45.8 17.0 33.3
1950 18.9 17.3 16.8 48.0 17.5 34.5
1951 20.3 18.7 17.9 49.9 18.7 37.8
1952 21.6 20.0 18.6 50.8 20.0 39.5
1953 23.2 21.7 19.1 52.0 21.7 40.5
1954 25.3 23.9 19.8 54.9 23.9 42.2
1955 26.9 25.6 20.2. 55.0 25.6 43.2
1956 28.0 26.9 20.5 53.7 26.8 43.9
1957 . 29.0 28,0 21.1 53.6 27.8 45.0
1958 80.4 29.1 22.7 58.4 28.9 49.3
1959 31.4 29.8 53.4
1960 32.7 30.9 58.0
SOURcE
Mortgage Debt:
1940-45A: Col. 1: Vol II, Table IV-c-lle-1, sum of lines 10 and 14.
Col. 2: Ibid., line 11.
1945B-60: Estimates are based mainly on Kiaman, Volume of Mortgage Debt, and
are extended by using his methods.
Col. 1: Vol. II, Sum of Tables IV-c-Ila and line 8.
Col. 2: Table IV-c-lIa, line 1.
Col. 3: Table IV-c-llb, line 2.
Col. 4: Sum of Tables IV-c-lla and IV-c-llb, line 4.
Col. 5: Table LV-c-lla, line 8.
Col. 6: Table IV-c-llb, line 8.
Value:
1900-45A: Col. 1: Goldsmith, National Wealth, sum of Tables A-35, cols. 2. 3, and 5,
and A-40, Col. 1.




Cal. 1: Lines 1 and 8.
Col. 2: Lines 4 and 5.
Col. 3: Lines 13 and 14.
Col. 4: Lines 6, 7, 11, and 12.
Col. 5: Line 1.
Col. 6: Line 8.
These ratios were not computed for 1900-45A because the estimated distribution
of mortgage debt between corporate and unincorporated business, based on Gold-
smith, A Study of Saving, Vol. 1, Table does not appear to be compatible with
the distribution of residential structures from Goldsmith, The National Wealth of
the United States in the Postwar Period, Princeton for NBER, 1962, Table A-39.
bNotavailable for 1900-45A.
Swings in the debt-to-value ratio have appeared to follow the mover.
ments of long building cycles, rising rapidly in the 1920's and the
postwar period and falling during the 1930's and early 1940's. The
movements of the series are quite similar to those of the share. of mort-
gages in total liabilities (Table 74).
It is apparent that high rates of building tend to raise the aggregate
debt-to-value ratio. This is presumably because they add to the housing
stock a large number of new units, of which a high proportion are
mortgaged and on which the debt-to-value ratios are much higher
than on old houses. But it is also clear that the building rate is not the
only influence, for the debt ratio rose sharply from 1929 to 1933 when
there was little new construction. In that period the rise was a result of
a decline in house prices—the only substantial decline in our record.
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick note that a puzzling feature of the
trend is the failure of the debt ratio to rise in the long period before
World War I. There was a considerable increase in the proportion of
owner-occupied houses mortgaged and, at least between 1890 and
1920, a small rise in the debt ratio for mortgaged houses. It is con-
ceivable that there were offsetting changes in rental housing. Or, as the
authors suggest,'7 this may be a statistical The 1890 mortgage
level, and thus the 1890 debt-to-value ratio, may have been overstated.
And an overestimate of the 1920 housing stock may have caused an
understatement of the 1920 debt ratio. If their suggestions are correct,
there has been an even greater long-term upward trend in the debt
ratios than the data show.
The postwar rise in the ratio of mortgage debt to value took place
in the face of roughly a doubling of construction costs. The previous
large increases in the debt ratio had been in 1922-29, when prices rose
oriiy moderately while the building rate was high, and in 1929-33 when
prices fell.
pp. 168-169.
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Part of the explanation for the postwar increase is that the effect of
price changes and repayments, which tend to reduce the debt ratio on
existing houses, was swamped by the effect of the high rate of new con-
struction, which tends to raise it. The other factor was that owners of
old houses, as a group, realized some of the capital gains arising from
price increase by raising their mortgage indebtedness.
The evidence on this point is fragmentary because little is known
about the proportion of gross mortgage flows which are for new
houses. Using any of the estimates quoted later in this paper, it is
clear that in two of the years of large capital gains, 1946 and the
net increase in nonfarm residential debt on one- to four-family struc-
turés was greater than gross lending on new construction. Thus, in
these two years at least, owners of existing houses were increasing their
mortgage In later years the picture is obscured by differences
among the estimates of mortgage lending on new construction. But
there were always large gross additions to debt on existing houses and
these always exceeded partial—presumably voluntary—prepayments.
However, they were rarely greater than the sum of prepayments and
amortization.
Other evidence also points to a tendency for owners of existing
houses to raise their mortgage indebtedness or at least not to permit it
to fall. For example, there were 4,805,000 owner-occupied nonfarm
houses reported as mortgaged in the 1940 Census (Table 83). Over a
period of ten years, it would be expected that many of these' mortgages
would be paid off, particularly since the great majority of them re-
quired regular payments on principal.'8 Yet, in the 1950 Census, there
TABLE 85
NONFARM OWNZR-OCCUPIED HousEs BUILT 1940 AND 1930 AND







1940 4,805 4,026 2,837
1950 5.060 S,996 2,894
1956 4,034 3,231 '
1940: U.S. Census of Housing: 1940, Vol. IV, Part 1, pp. 4 and 9.
1950: U.S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. IV, Part 1, pp. 60 and 162.
1956: 1956 National Housing Inventory, Vol. II, p. 23.
Number of properties. In a few cases there was more than one structure on a
property.
18 U.S. Census of Housing: 1910, Vol. IV, Part 1, p. 5.
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were 5,060,000 such mortgaged houses which had been built before
1940. To some extent the increase might be explained by a shift of
existing houses from farm to nonfarm and from rented to owner-
occupied.'9 But this shift does not seem sufficient to explain the
steadiness of the number of mortgaged houses, considering, how many
mortgages might normally be expected to run out in ten years. For
example, from 1950 to 1959, when the mortgage and housing stock
was newer, the increase in the number of debt-free houses was 20 per
cent of the initial number.2°
A similar pattern can be seen for one-family houses. Among these
there was a very slight decline in number between 1940 and 1950 and
then an increase to '1956. For one-family houses built before 1930, the
number mortgaged increased slightly between 1940 and 1950 and then
jumped by more than 10 per cent in the next six years.
The aggregate debt-to-value ratios discussed so far can be analyzed
as the product of mortgage flows and price changes. The flows include
new home mortgage lending (which depends on the rate of building
and the loan-to-value ratio on new construction), mortgage repay-
ments, scheduled and unscheduled, which operate to reduce the debt
ratio, and lending on existing homes. These mortgage flows, and the
corresponding equity flows, are discussed in later parts of this chapter.
The effect of price changes is two-edged. An increase in prices, given
the level of mortgage debt, lowers the debt ratios But if it leads home-
owners to expect further price increases it may, by tempting them to
raise or to retain their mortgages, lead to a rise in the debt ratio. The
influence of prices on home-owners' equity is taken up briefly below
and has been discussed in more general form in Part Two.
SECTORAL DEBT-TO-VALUE RATIOS
It would be logical to expect households, corporations, and unincor-
porated enterprises to own different kinds of residential real estate
and to finance their holdings in different ways. Sectoral debt-to-value
ratios are of interest for the light they can shed on methods of financ-
ing. Unfortunately, the sectoral allocations of housing assets and mort-
gage liabilities are so arbitrary that the ratios must be viewed more as
a working out of the allocation assumptions than as independent
information.
Unincorporated business, to which only multifamily housing has
been allocated, showed the lowest debt ratios, with much less growth
wasan increase in the number of owner-occupied nonfarm units built
before 1940 from 11,413 (U.S. Census of Housing: 1910, Vol. II, Part 1, p. 12)to
13,739 (U.S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. H, Ch. 1, p. 6).
20Mortgaged Homes in The United States—Growthinthe1950's,Washington,
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1960.
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in the ratio than households, and, in fact, a decline for several years.
Corporate-owned real estate, including both homes and multifamily
structures, carried the heaviest debt, .but the increase was fairly slow
except during the 1948-50 spurt in multifamily construction. These
years were characterized by very high debt ratios on some new apart-
ment buildings including, according to later charges, cases where the
debt was greater than the cost. The low rate of increase in the debt
ratio for noncorporate housing compared to corporate may be due to
the fact that the additions to multifamily housing tended to be in the
corporate sector, increasing the proportion of new housing there.
On the whole, the sectoral debt-to-value ratios seem to bear a sensible
relationship to those by type of housing in the same table. Nonfärm
households follow the ratios for one- to four-family housing very closely
and corporations' ratios are similar to, but somewhat higher than,
those for multifamily housing. Only the noncorporate ratio appears
suspiciously low, considering that this sector holds only multifamily
properties. The age of the houses in this sector and the fact that non-
corporate holdings tend to be in the five- to forty-nine-unit dass and
corporation properties in the class •of fifty units and over can be
cited as possible reasons for the low ratios.: As will be seen later, it is the
structures of fifty units and over which pull up the debt ratios for
multifamily housing. Structures of five to forty-nine units have debt
ratios much like those of one to four units.
Debt-to-value ratios for various types of owner-occupied and rental
housing can be derived only for 1950 (Table 84). The debt burden
(the ratio of debt to the total value of properties) is heaviest on owner-
occupied one-family houses and lightest on owner-occupied two- to
four-family structures, with rental property in between.21
These ratios are the outcome of two opposing factors. On mortgaged
properties alone, the debt burden is higher on rental than on owner-
occupied properties, mainly because mortgaged properties of fifty units
or more carry such a high rate of indebtedness. What lifts the debt
ratio for owner-occupied properties in the aggregate is the large propor-
tion of them which are mOrtgaged—almost 50 per cent in value terms
compared toper cent Of rental properties. Since one would expect
a greater proportion mortgaged among multifamily properties than
among smaller rental properties, these findings suggest that only a
21 debt-to-value ratios in Table 84 are not strictly comparable with those in
Table 82 because the census values of tangible assets used here differ from the
perpetual inventory values used elsewhere in thiS volume (see Table 66). The
perpetual inventory estimates are relatively higher for multifamily structures, im-
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SOURCE TO TABLE 84 (concluded)
Col. 2, line 1: Table B-i, line 1.
2: Table A-5, line 4.
3: Sum of lines 1 and 2.
4-8: These values are estimated in several steps:(a) Number of dwelling
units, by size of property, from various tables in U.S. Census of Hous-
ing: 1950, Vol. IV, Part 1. (Total, p. XVI, Table A; 1 unit, p.. 467; 2-4
units, p. 554; 5 units and over, total above minus units in 1- to 4.unit
properties.) The distribution by property size (number of units in prop-
erty) of the units in properties of 5 units and over was estimated by
multiplying the number of properties in each size class by the midpoint
of the class and then adjusting these figures to add to the Census total
for properties of 5 units and over (above). (b) &ent per unit,: median
rents, from U.S. Census of Housing: 1950 (Vol. IV, Part 1, pp. 474, 557,
596, and 607) multiplied by the mean-to-median ratio (1.10335) from
Table A-Il. (c) Total value: the total rent in each size class (number
of units multiplied by rent per unit) is multiplied by the ratio of value
to rent for that class (Table A-16, notes to cots. S and 7).
9: Sum of lines 3 and 8.
Col. 3: US. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. IV, Part 1, from Table 1 of each section.
Col. 4: Col. 2 divided by col. 1.
Col. 5.: Col. 3 divided by col. 2.
Col. 6: U.S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. IV, Part I, from Table 3 of each section.
Col. 7: Col. 3 divided by col. 1.
small proportion of one- to four-unit rental properties are mortgaged.
Some data on number of units by mortgage status confirm the im-
pression that a high proportion of one- to four-unit rental properties
are debt free (Table 85). Less than a quarter of such units had mort-
gage debts in 1950, compared with almost 44 per cent of owner-occupied
units. In 1956 the difference was even greater: 15 per cent on rental
properties against 55 per cent on owner-occupied units.
An annual .seriesfor mortgage debt on owner-occupied nonfarm
homes is estimated in Appendix Table B-3, col. 2. Compared with the
corresponding home values,22 it shows a gradual rise in the debt ratio
from 13 per cent in 1945 to 33 per cent in 1960. The ratio for one- to
four-family rental properties plus vacant units23 is lower in every
year and rises more slowly, from 12 per cent in 1945 to 21 per cent in
1960.
Net Flows of Housing Funds in the Postwar Period
Many aspects of postwar residential housing finance, such as the effects
of government policy on the flow of mortgage funds, the distribution
of financing among fund supplying institutions, and changes in the
investment policies of banks and other financing agencies, have been
Table 69, lines 1 and 5.
Debt from Table B-S. col. 1 minus col. 2; value from Table 69, lines 6, 7, and 8.
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TABLE 85
MORTGAGE STATUS OF ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY NONFARM DWELLING UNITS, BY 1950 AND 1956
Numberof Dwelling Units(thousands) Mortgaged
Umtsas
Percentageof Not
Total Mortgaged Mortgaged Total
1950
1.. 1- to 4-family nonfarin houses 35,300 12,498 22,802 35.4
2.Owner-occupied 19,802 8,707 11,095 440
3.Renter-occupied 15,498 3,79j* 11,707 24.5
1956











SouRcE: Lines 1,4: Mortgaged Homes in the United States—Growth in the 1950's.
2: U.S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, p. xxxvi. It was
assumed that units not reporting mortgage status were distrib-
uted in the same proportion as those which did report.
3: Line 1 minus line 2.
5: 1956 National Housing Inventory, Vol. II, p. 17.
6: Line 4 minus line 5.
1Thisestimate is much larger than the number of rental dwelling units on owner-
and renter-occupied nonfarm properties of 1-4 units from Vol. IV of the 1950 Hous-
ing Census(2,999,000,see pp. 322, 472, and 554). Aside from reporting errors, the
main difference should be rental Units in structures of 1-4 units on properties of 5
or more units.
examined by Saul Kiaman in The Postwar Residential Mortgage
Market and by a number of other studies.24
We therefore have bypassed these questions, for the most part, and
concentrate on the relationship of housing finance to the household
sector andon the distribution between mortgage and equity financing
of housing.
The value of both nonfarm residential construction, and total net
acquisition of assets25 by nonfarm households increased until 1955 or
1956 and then declined somewhat (Table 86 and Chart 25). So sim-
ilar were the movements of the two series that the share of construc-
24Forexample, Grebler, Blank, and Winnick, Capital Formation; Jack M. Gutten-
tag, "The Short Cycle in Residential Construction," American Economic Review,
June 1961, and "Some Studies of the Post-World War II Residential Construction
and Mortgage Markets"(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University,
May 1958); Leo Grebler, Housing Issues in Economic Stabilization Policy (NBER
Occasional Paper 72, New York, 1960); and papers by Saul B. Kiaman, JamesJ. O'Leary, and Warren L. Smith in Study of Mortgage Credit (85th Congress, 2nd
Session, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Hous-
ing, Washington, 1958).
25Purchasesminus sales.HOUSING iN THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET
TABLE 86





Total Flows Land Land
(1) (2) (8) (4)
1946 5.06 4.82 .24 1.00
1947 7.84 5.66 2.18 8.36
1948 11.44 5.86 5.58 7.30
1949 10.55 5.27 5.28 6.86
1950 14.29 8.73 5.56 7,71
1951 14.57 7.77 6.80 8.99
1952 14.79 7.48 7.81 9.52
1953 16.10 8.24 7.86 10.28
1954 16.65 10.09 6.56 9.06
1955 20.89 13.42 7.47 10.60
1956 20.26 11.50 8.76 11.80
1957 19.20 9.17 10.03 12.91
1958 19.45 11.74 7.71 10.63
1959 27.41 15.08 12.33 16.44
1960 25.19 12.16 13.03 16.80
1946-60 243.69 136.99 106.70 148.26
SouRcE
Col. 1: Table 72, line 13.
2: Klaman, Volume of Mortgage Del't. Table 4, col. 1, corrected and extended to
1960 using his methods and sources.
3: Col. 1 minus col. 2. This is a rough estimate, assuming that all, financing of
new construction other than mortgages is equity, and omitting investment in
residential land.
4: Col. S plus 15 per cent of col. I. See Goldsmith, National Wealth, Table A-b,
note to col. 2.
'Excluding government.
tion varied only between 23 and 27 per cent of asset acquisitions in
all the years from 1948 through 1958 (Chart 26).
Mortgage flows contrasted with construction and asset acquisition
by undergoing large fluctuations, particularly sharp peaks in 1950,
1955, and 1959. Equity financing of new houses2° also fluctuated con-
siderably, but with quite different timing. Unlike the three series men-
tioned previously and unlike even the annual series on personal in-
come, it moved up and down in complete conformity with postwar
Measured here by the difference between construction value and net mortgage










F!ow of Funds into Total Net Acquisition of Assets
by Nonfarm Households and into Nonfarm Residential
Construction, 1946-60
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CHART26
Mortgage and Equity Flows into Nonfarm Residential
Construction in Relation to Personal Income and Nonfarm
Household Net Acquisition of Assets, 1946-60
302
1946
Source: See source to Chart 25; Survey of Current Business, July 1962; and
U.S. Income and Output.RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
business cycles. It reached peaks in 1948, 1953, and 1957, and fell in
each of the following recessions.27
In most of the years after 1949 mortgage and equity flows moved in
opposite directions, the main exceptions being the years following
troughs—1950, 1955, and 1959. In all three cycles mortgage lending in-
creased wth a rush at or soon after the trough and receded a year later,
while equity financing continued to rise throughout the upswing.
Most studies of the postwar housing market have found that the
availability of mortgage credit has been an important variable deter-
mining the rate of construction. The synchronization between the ratio
of mortgage flows to personal income and the ratio of residential con-
struction to personal income (Chart 26) seems consistent with this
finding. Consumers do appear to have been persuaded to purchase
more new housing in relation to their incomes in 1950, 1955, and 1959,
for example, than in any other years. However, the proportion of net
acquisition of assets which went into housing was apparently not
affected; it does not reflect the flow of mortgage funds at all. In other
words, consumers added to other assets as rapidly as to housing assets
during the postwar housing splurges.28
There were very wide fluctuations in the ratio of mortgage lending
to personal income. However, the relation of equity funds to income
was almost inverse to that of mortgages. Although, relative to personal
income, more housing was built and more mortgage funds were lent in
1950 and 1955 than in most of the other postwar years, home-owners in-
vested comparatively little of their own funds in new construction. Part
of the increase in mortgage flows, for example, between 1949 and 1950
and between 1953 and 1955, was absorbed by a rise in the ratio of net
mortgage flows to construction expenditures. Presumably, although not
necessarily, this rise could have reflected a rise in debt ratios on new
construction, but this question involves gross flows which will be dis-
cussed later in this chapter.29
27Somerough calculations with preliminary data for 1961 suggest that the record
of perfect conformity continued with a peak in equity financing in 1960.
28Thestability of the ratio of housing to total asset acquisitions is not due to
the overwhelming importance of housing investment. Residential construction was
rarely as much as a quarter of total acquisitions of assets.
The measure of equity flow used here, which is the difference between a gross
flow (nonfarm residential construction expenditures) and a net flow (increase in
nonfarm residential mortgage debt), has several peculiarities. It describes the house-
hold sector in the aggregate, not home buyers, because the mortgage repayments
are not made by the same households as the Construction or house purchase expend-
itures. Furthermore, this measure of equity covers all sources of funds other than
mortgages, and may thus include other types of loans which may be used to finance
house purchases.
The treatment of land value also causes difficulties. Construction expenditures do
not include land purchases, and equity flows estimated from construction are there.
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Gross Flows of Housing Funds in the Postwar Period
SOURCES AND TYPES OF GROSS FLOW DATA
Net flows of. funds are only a step away from the national and sectoral
balance sheets. from which they are derived. From this closeness they
gain.reliability,but at the price of hiding many important features of
the movement of funds through the housing market. Funds are used
not only for the purchase of newly built houses but also for the pur-
chase of used houses, for repairs and alterations on existing houses, for
mortgage amortization and prepayments, and, to some extent, for pur-
poses entirely unconnected with the financing of residential real estate.
Funds enter the market not only via new house mortgages and equity
flows but also through mortgages on existing houses, both for refinanc-
ing and as additions to mortgages, and through equity• flows on and
sales of existing houses. To examine these relationships, one must look
behind the net flows to the gross flows which give rise to them.
The data on gross flows, which are described in Appendix C, are
less reliable than the balance sheets and net flows, but they were con-
structed in such a way as to fit together with them and to reconcile the
net flOws with, in most cases, the regularly published series on mort-
gage recordings of $20,000 or less. The recordings are assumed to
represent gross extensions of nonfarm residential one- to four-family
mortgage debt. These mortgage recordings are based on reports by
mortgage lenders and to that extent are fairly reliable, but they include
some nonresidential realestate and exclude some higher-priced
residences.3°
Gross mortgage repayments can be calculated from gross lending and
fore understated by the cost of land purchased by households from other sectors.
The other equity estimate, including land costs, probably is an overstatement, be-
cause the figure of 15 per cent represents all land purchases rather than only those
from other sectors.
80TheSavings and Home Financing Source Book, Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. (Washington,, 1960, p. 46) gives a more detailed discussion of the series. A
more thorough. examination of gross flow data and the problems involved in meas-
unng them can be found in Saul B. Klaman. Flow Data for. current
Market Analysis," 1959 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section
of the American Statistical Association. Appendix C of this paper describes some of
the gross flow data for types of mortgages and institutions on which these aggre-
gates are based.
Another. series on mortgage loans made on one- to four-family nonfarm homes,
covering 1925-50, was published by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in Esti-
mated Home Mortgage Debt and Financing Activity, 1950 (Washington,. 1951). The
series was discontinued after that date.
Grebler, Blank, and Winnick (Capital Formation, Table M.1)estimated the
gross flow of mortgage and equity funds into all residential real estate for 1911-52.
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net changes in mortgage debt outstanding. The breakdown of repay-
ments by the FHLBB into amortization, partial prepayments, and pre-
payments in full is less reliable than the total
Figures for tangible uses of funds are NBER estimates based mainly
on official data for new construction, repairs, and alterations.31 If, as
now seems likely, these are substantially understated, we have probably
correspondingly underestimated net equity flows into housing and
overstated the relative role of mortgages in housing finance.
Transactions, in existing houses are taken from a roughly estimated
series formerly published by the Federal Reserve Board as part of its
flOw-of-funds accounts but since discontinued. We have extrapolated
them to 1958 on the basis of FRB estimates of the number of purchases
of existing houses and average values of one-family houses insured by
the FHA under Section 203, and to '1960 by a FHLBB series for mort-
gage lending on existing houses and FHA data on loan-to-value ratios
for existing house loans under Section 203.
Both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board have made estimates of 'the division between lending on new
houses and lending on existing houses. The FRB figures have. not been
published officially but most of them appear in Kiaman's monograph.32
There is some foundation for the breakdown in data published for
savings and loan association lending38 and for FHA and VA mortgage
extensions. The FHLBB gives consistently lower figures for extension
of mortgages' on new homes and therefore implies greater equity
financing of them. The two series differ more in level than in movement
which is close to being parallel except in a couple of years.
Mortgage loans, other than oh new houses, among sources of funds,
are broken down by the FHLBB into refinancing, which is estimated
as being equal to the item on the uses side called "prepayments in
full," and "additional financing." The FRB estimates are divided into
mortgage credit for "existing house purchases" and for "other pur-
poses." This classification is based on, and estimated from, the data
for savings and loan associations 'mentioned above. The "other" category
presumably includes, therefore, loans for repairs, additions and altera-
tions, and refinancing.84. The FRB totals for "other purposes," however,
81Goldsmith,National Wealth, Appendix..B.
82Klaman,Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Chart 22 and Table A-b.
83 discussionby Kiaman (ibid., pp. 159-168)suggests that the savings and
loan data contain many defects. "Loans classified as for construction of homes
include temporary loans to builders as well as permanent loans to individuals.
Loans classified as for purchase of homes include, loans for purchase of both new
and existing houses. Moreover, the figures. given are confused by a significant
degree of duplication; loans reported once• under the construction category are
reported again under the purchase category."



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































are much lower than the FHLBB figures for refinancing alone and it
therefore seems likely that the FRB excludes refinancing in connection
with house sales.
Tables 87 and 88 summarize the available data on total gross flows
of funds through the one- to four-family housing market. The tangible
uses represent, for the purchasers, real investment in housing. This
includes a small amount of dealers' margins on sales of existing houses
and land costs on new homes. All of the tangible uses, excluding the
purchase of existing houses but including the cost of the transactions
in them, are the real components of the changes in the stock of housing
in the national balance sheets. The intangible uses involve the repay-
ment of housing debt out of equity funds or out of the item "additional
financing of existing homes."
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF GROSS MORTGAGE FLOWS
One feature common to almost all the absolute series on tangible
housing expenditures and gross flows of mortgage credit is their lack
of synchronization with the cyclical fluctuations of the economy as a
whole. They did undergo cycles, but the peaks and troughs did not, in
general, coincide with those marked out by National Bureau reference
dates. There is, in fact, some evidence that mortgage flows moved
countercyclically.36 Among the uses of funds, prepayments and pur-
chases of new houses were at their peak in 1955 (Chart 27) and pur-
chases of existing houses in 1956. All three of the series showed
troughs in 1957—a reference peak. Prepayments and existing home
purchases hit their troughs in 1948, and only new construction coin-
cided with the reference trough in 1949. None of the three, at least in
these annual data, was marked by the 1953-54 business cycle. The only
area of gross uses which followed the reference dates was repairs and
alterations which increased in every year except 1949, 1954, and 1958,
declining in the first and third recessions and remaining steady in the
other. Amortization payments rose in every year without regard to
cyclical phase.
Among the sources of funds, refinancing and sales of existing houses
are entirely or mainly the obverse of prepayments and existing house
purchases and therefore need no additional description. The extension
of mortgages on new homes exhibited the familiar sharp peaks in 1950,
1955, and 1959, and troughs in 1952 and 1957. "Additional financing"
on existing homes, after falling for several years, rose rapidly from
1949 to 1958. It reached peaks in two trough years, 1954 and 1958.
It is, of course, not correct to say that the housing and mortgage
series are unaffected by the business cycle; the apparent dependence of
See, for example, Gutten tag, 'Some Studies of the Post-World War II Residential
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CHART 27
Gross Sources and Uses of Funds, One- to Four-Family
Sources








the flow of funds into new housing mortgages on interest rates in other
sectors is evidence enough of a connection. But the timing of postwar
reference cycles is not clearly imprinted on these flows, with the possi-
ble exception of the repair and alteration series.
Many of the gross flow series for housing show signs of a slackening
or an interruption of growth after 1955. This appeared in several
components of the total, not only in the extension of mortgages on
new homes, which had undergone a considerable decline after 1950,
but also in refinancing and sales of existing houses, both of which had
risen uninterruptedly since 1948.
The one important source of funds not shown in Chart 27 is the
flow of equity funds into housing: the flow of owners' funds, excluding
capital gains. This is one element, not always the most important, in
the change in owners' equity, a breakdown of which is given in Table
89 and Chart 28. The flow of owners' equity funds (gross saving) for
TABLE 89
COMPOSITION OF CHANCE IN OwNElts' EQUITY, ONE- TO FOUR-FAMILY NONFARM HousEs, 1946-60
Depre-
Change Change ciation
in in Owners' (replace-Owners'
Owners' Gross Mortgage Gross ment Net Capital
EquityInvestmentDebt Saving cost) Saving Gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1946 20.9 5.3 4.4 .9 3.4 —2.5 23.4
1947 32.6 8.1 5.2 2.9 4.2 —1.8 339
1948 12.2 11.8 5.1 6.7 4.8 1.9 10.3
1949 —7.7 105 4.3 6.2 4.9 1.3 —9.0
1950 29.0 14.8 7.6 7.2 5.3 1.9 27.1
1951 11.7 15.8 6.5 8.8 5.9 2.9 8.8
1952 9.0 15.8 6.8 9.0 6.2 2.8 6.2
1953 4.5 17.0 7.6 9.4 6.5 2.9 1.6
1954 2.5 17.8 9.6 8.2 6.6 1.6 .9
1955 15.5 22.5 12.6 9.9 7.1 2.8 12.7
1956 14.4 21.8 10.8 11.0 7.6 3.4 11.0
1957 8.7 20.7 8.6 12.1 8.0 4.1 4.6
1958 9.2 21.2 10.1 11.1 8.4 2.7 6.5
1959 19.7 80.2 13.2 17.0 8.8 8.2 11.5
1960 6.8 27.8 10.4 17.4 9.4 8.0 —1.2
SOURCE
Col. 1: Change in total value (Table 67) minus change in mortgage debt (col. 3).
2: Table 88, sum of lines 3, 5, and 7.
3: Estimated Home Mortgage Debt and Financing Activity, 1961, FHLBB, 1962.
4: Col. 2 minus col. 3.
5: Goldsmith, National Wealth, Table B-5.
6: Col. 4 minus col. 5.
7: Col. 1 minus col. 6.
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CHART28
Composition of Change in Owners' Equity, One- to
Four-Family Nonfarm Houses, 1946-60
Capital gains
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suchrequirements as amortization payments and down payments on
new houses is seen to follow all of the postwar reference cycles. It
reached peaks in 1948, 1953, 1957, and probably, judging from pre-
liminary data mentioned earlier, in 1960 also; and fell in 1949, 1954,
and
During the first two.. years after the war the flow of equity funds was
not even sufficient to offset depreciation. After 1948 the equity flow
36Thisis a somewhat broader concept of equity flow than that shown in Table
86 since this one includes net saving in existing houses.
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exceeded depreciation by about $2 billion at first and then $8 to $4
billion. At the end of the period the difference jumped. to $8 billion.
But the three postwar recessions cut into this excess sharply.
Amortization payments never equaled depreciation, and even amor-
tization plus partial prepayments on mortgages (total prepayments are
assumed to be all for refinancing) only caught up with depreciation in
1960 (Chart 29). The main reason for the gap was the large element
in depreciation which represents price change. Depreciation, when
measured at replacement cost, varies with the price level, while amor-
CHART29
Depreciation, Amortization, Equity Funds, One- to
Four-Family Nonfarm Housing, 1946-60
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Billion dollars
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Source: Tables 88 and 89 and Goldsmith, National Wealth, Table B-5.HOUSING IN THE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEET
tization is related to the. original cost of building and is not affected
by subsequent price changes. If the comparison is made with original
cost depreciation, amortization was higher except in the first two
years, and rose more rapidly.
The low level of gross saving compared to depreciation in the first
five years after the war did not mean that home-owners' equity was fail-
ing to grow. Except in the recession year 1949, there were very large
gains in equity, three of them (1946, 1947, 1950) being greater than
any later ones. These were due to large capital gains from increases in
house prices, represented in these computations by construction costs.
Capital gains far outweighed saving as a source of increases in equity
in the early postwar years and were still of considerable importance
in the 1950's. In a number of ways fluctuations in the level of capital
gains follow those in such series as the ratio of house purchases to the
stock of houses (see below).. Both were at a high level just after the
war, fell to troughs in 1949; both bit peaks in 1950, 1955, and 1959,
and troughs in 1957, and declined sharply in 1960. The three peaks in
capital gains were all in periods of considerable residential construc-
tion
RELATIONSHIPOF NEW HOUSE PURCHASES TO TOTAL HOUSE
PURCHASES AND STOCK OF HOUSING
The period of rapid growth (from 2 to 5 per cent) in new house pur-
chases relative to the existing stock of housing ends with the 1950 peak
(Chart After that no upward. trend is in evidence, although each
of the following peaks was slightly above its predecessor. The distinc-
tive cyclical swings observed in insured mortgages and related series
stand out clearly. Sales of existing houses, on the other hand, were large
relative to the total housing stock just after the war. They sagged
quickly, then rose again 1955, more than matching their initial
ratio to the housing stock, and have declined almost every year since
then.
The distribution of house purchases reflects these differences in rate
of growth. The share of new houses in total purchases was less than
one-quarter in 1946; it rose rapidly to almost a half in 1948, and then
began a gradual fluctuating decline which brought it to about 40
per cent by 1958. In the last two years, however, it suddenly reached
close to 50 per cent again. At first, after the war, there were very few
new houses to buy, and there was probably considerable purchasing
of former rental housing of prewar vintage, which accounted for the
87Grebler,Blank, and Winnick(Capital Formation, pp. 18 1.189)discuss the
flow of mortgage and equity funds into new residential construction from 1911
to 1952.
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importance of the purchases of existing houses. Then, after the first
postwar housing boom had built up a considerable reservoir of post-
war houses, these began to be sold by their first owners, slowly in-
creasing the existing house share of the market until the recent
reversal.38
GROSS MORTGAGE FINANCING RATIOS
One of the advantages of gross flow data is that they give a much clearer
picture than net flows of the financing needs and practices of home
buyers. The net financing ratio (the ratio of net mortgage extensions
to purchases of houses) describes the financing of the nonfarm sector
as a whole, but the gross financing ratio describes the financing of the
part of the household sector that is doing the buying. It does not cancel
out mortgage repayments by home-owners against mortgage borrowing
by home buyers.
There are two sources of gross mortgage flow data, the Federal
serve Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The FRB data,
some of which were published by Klaman, diverge substantially fr9m
those of the FHLBB, mainly by showing a lower level of lending on
new homes, despite the fact that the two agencies start from the same
estimates of total gross lending. However, they generally agree well in
movement except for the sharp fluctuations in the FHLBB series in
1950 and 1951 (Chart 31).
Gross financing ratios were very high just after the war, declined
to a low point in 1952, and crept up after that but not to anything
near the 1946 and 1947 levels. At times the two components moved
quite differently. The new house financing ratio reached high levels in
1946, 1950, and 1955 and has undergone wide swings without any
decided trend, despite the efforts of government guarantee programs.
The financing ratio for existing houses reached very high levels—80 to
84 per cent—just after the war. Then they fell to approximately 60
per cent in the early 1950's and rose to 70 per cent and above in 1958-
60, higher, surprisingly, than ratios for new houses.
It seems unlikely that all of the financing on existing houses was
connected with transactions in them. Even the loan-to-value ratios for
FHA-guaranteed mortgages, usually higher than on conventional loans,
did not reach the level of the gross financing ratio in 1946 and 1947.
88Estimates of numbers or proportions of new and existing houses purchased in
1947-58 were made in Survey of Consumer Finances reports published inthe
Federal Reserve Bulletin. The share of new houses in numbers was generally below
the value shares (Chart 30) ,anappropriate relationship since average values of
new houses are considerably higher than those of old ones. Buta puzzlingfeature
of the series is that in most years after 1948 it leads the value ratios consistently by
a year. The aggregate values of house purchases estimated in these reports were far
below those in Table 88.
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Purchases of New and Existing Housing in Relation to
Stock of Housing, 1946-60
Per cent
Furthermore, only in 1946-48 did the ratios of mortgage extension to
value of transactions •n existing houses exceedthat on new houses
until. 1958-60. The burst of mortgage financing just after the war seems
to have reflected not only the high level of housing market activity but
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Source:New and existing house purchases are from Table 88. Stock of one- to
four-family housing is from Table 69. Number of new and existing house purchases
is as follows (in millions)
New as Percentage
New Existing of Total
1 947ft 0.6 1 .6 27
0.8 1.6 33
1949b 0.6 1.0 38
1950b 0.8 1.4 36
195P 0.7 1.7 29
1952° 0.6 Li 35
1953° 0.7 1.5 32
1954° 1.0 1.5 40





These data are from Federal Reserve Bulletin as follows:S July 1951; b August
1955;August1 956; p. 820;June 1957, pp. 628-629; ° September 1959,
p. 1099; and1960SurveyofConsumer Finances, p. 53.
Itis possible that the postwar surge of existing house transfers, al-
though it was not as great in comparison to the housing stock as that
oE 1954-56(Chart 30), required a higher proportion of mortgage
financing. A larger part of the sales during the 1940's than in the 1950's
may have been to former renters who were entering the market without
equity from sales of other houses. Such purchasers would be forced to
rely more heavily on mortgage credit than former home-owners.
Several features of the data on gross financing ratios are reflected. in
the information for FHA-insured loans under Section 203, the main
FHA home mortgage program. The peaks in 1950 and 1955, the trough
in 1952, and the rapid fall from 1955 to 1957 all show up in both sets
of data for new houses (Chart 32).
The existing house ratios under Section 203 confirm the 1955 peak,
but they were fairly steady before 1954 and add to the evidence that
the high ratios of 1946-48 were not a product of transactions in houses.
The FHA ratios do contain one distinctive feature hardly visible at
all in the totals. That is a very rapid rise from 1957 to 1959 in the
financing ratios for both new and existing house transactions to the
highest levels in the postwar years. The only reflection of such a rise in
Chart 31 is in lending on existing houses, and even that ratio does not
reach a level higher than in the 1940's.
DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS FLOWS AMONG TYPES OF MORTGAGE
AND FINANCING INSTITUTION
Eata on net mortgage flows show how much credit is being supplied to
the mortgage market by each institution or through each type Of mort-
gage, after deducting the funds received from mortgage sales and re-
payments. But since the mortgagors receiving new credit are typically
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CHART31
Financing of New and Existing House Purchases,
Gross Extension of Mortgages as Percentage of Cost of Houses,






Mortgage Financing Ratios, Transactions Under FHA Section 203,
1946-60
not those who are making mortgage repayments, the gross flows of
mortgage credit may be more useful for tracing the influence of credit
conditions on the mortgage market.
The most striking difference between the picture presented by gross
flows and that shown by net flows is in the distribution by type, among
conventional, FHA, and VA mortgages (Chart 33). Conventional mort-
gages supplied less than half of the net flow from 1947 through 1951
and never above 65 per cent until 1958. Their share increased after
that, reaching 70-75 per cent in 1958-60. Gross flows show the share of
319
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CHART33
Percentage Distribution of Gross and Net Flows, One- to
Four-Family Nonfarm Residential Mortgages,
by Type of Mortgage, 1946-60
Gross Flows Net Flows
Source: Net flows are from Kiamon, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Tables 26, 31,








1960. using his methods. flows are
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conventional mortgages always above 64 per cent of the total, and ris-
ing considerably higher in recent. years.
The net flows exhibit violent shifts. from year to year in, the propor-
tions supplied in the three forms. The width of the fluctuations is
illustrated by their range: from 37 per cent of the net mortgage flow
to 75 per cent for conventional mortgages, 60 to —3 per cent for
VA mortgages, and from 38 to —9 per cent for FHA mortgages. Not
only were the shifts in net sources large over the period as a whole, but
most of the range was covered in periods of a year or two.
No such radical shifts in the type of mortgage funds.supplied appear
in the gross flow data. Here conventional mortgages are of much greater
importance than in the net flows, supplying 64 to 78 per cent of the
gross funds in every year. There was an upward trend in this ratio,
imparted mainly by the data for 1957-60. Gross flows of VA loans
varied between 7. and 28 per cent of the total (mostly between 15 and
22 per cent) and FHA loans between 4 and 19 per cent.39
In both gross and net flows, conventional loans moved inversely to
VA lending very regularly. The net flows of the two types moved in
the same direction only three times in the fourteen years, and the gross
flows only twice. FHA and VA loans changed in opposite directions
at times, particularly in 1948-51 and in 1958, but conventional and
FHA loans seem much less closely related. These facts suggest the
existence of competitive relationships, perhaps in response to changes
in interest rate differentials, between VA and conventional mortgages
more than between FHA and VA or between conventional and FHA
mortgages.
Use of gross instead of net, flows modifies the picture of the institu-
tional distribution of mortgage financing also (Chart 34). In every
case, both the extent of year-to-year fluctuations and the total range of
fluctuation are greatly reduced.
Of more interest is the fact that shifting' to gross flows reduces the
shares of several major sectors in mortgage financing. The share of life
insurance companies is reduced from 18 to 14 per cent for the postwar
period as a whole, that of savings and loan associations from 42 to 38
per cent, that of mutual savings banks from 14 to 10 per cent for
1949-60. Commercial banks and others, mainly individuals, are con-
siderably more important in the gross flows, supplying 37 per cent in
1949-60 compared to 25 per cent of the net..The whole group of com-
mercial and mutual savings banks and others were responsible, for 48
per cent of the gross flow of funds in the. postwar years against 41 per
cent of net flows. The Federal National Mortgage Association played
39 presenceof construction loans among conventional mortgiges tends to
exaggerate their importance but should not influence the stability of their share.
321HOUSING ZN THE NATIONAL BALANCESHEET
CHART34
Percentage Distribution of Gross and Net Flows, One- to
Four-Family Nonfarm Residential Mortgages,
by Type of Institution, 1946-60





Gross Flows Net Flows
1946'48'50'52'54'56 48 '58'601946 '50'5254'56'5$'60RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
Source:Net flows ore from Kiamon, Volume of Mortgage Debt, Tables 20 and
26, corrected and extended td 1960 using his methods. Gross flows ore from
Appendix Tables C-i, C-1O, C-14, and C-17, and, for FNMA, from Annual Re-
ports of Housing and Home Finance Agency, purchases minus sales of VA and FHA
home mortgages (Sections 8, 203, 221, 222, 603, 809, and 903) in secondary
market operations and special assistance activities.
aboutthe same part in both measures of financing, the main difference
being the smoothing of fluctuations.
The greater instability of the net flows is not a surprising finding; for
they are the result of subtracting from the fluctuating series on gross
acquisitions two much steadier series: a very mildly fluctuating but
rising series for repayments in full, and a series for amortization which
showed a steady upward trend with no fluctuations at all. Therefore,
when the gross flow remains constant the net flow falls. The size of
the difference between the two measures is a function of the size of, and
the trend in, mortgage repayments.
REPAYMENTS RATIOS
Data on repayments appear to be less reliable than those on gross ex-
tensions or on holdings of mortgages. All or almost all of the repay-
ments estimates are derived by subtracting net changes in holdings
from gross or net purchases of mortgages, and they therefore suffer from
the defects of both series, magnified by the fact that the
series is smaller than that on gross extensions. Among the items that
may end up in a supposed series on repayments are the effects of timing
differences in the recording of gross flow and net' flow data and the
effects of differences of concept and coverage between the recordings
data and those from balance sheets.4°
Despite the ambiguities in the repayments data, two conclusions
stand out clearly. The first is that the ratio of repayments to outstand-
ing debt is much higher for conventional mortgages than for guaran-
teed mortgages, and among the latter, higher for FHA than for VA
mortgages. The second conclusion is that the repayment ratio has been
falling during the last fifteen years for total mortgages, for each type
of mortgage (except VA mortgages after 1958), and for mortgages
held by each type of financial institution.
This decline in the repayment rate is apparently not a long-term
phenomenon. Grebler, Blank, and found that the rates were
quite low before the war. They ranged between 14 and 17 per cent in
40These differences, as well as some other infonnation on gross flows, are discussed
by Kiaman in the 1959 Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section
of the American Statistical Association, pp. 211-212, and are summarized in Appen-
dix C below.
41CapitalFormation, pp. 175-179.
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every year but one from 1930 through 194:1. But in the late 1920's they
were above 20 per cent, as in the building boom after World War 11.42
Repayments estimates, for all mortgages or for all of a given type,
FHA, VA, or 'conventiOnal, are likely to be more reliable than those for
particular sectors, because the former do not require information on
purchases and of mortgages among sectors. These intersector trans-
actions, about which very little information is available, cancel out
when the' economy as a whole is
The declines in repayment ratios for the majOr types of mortgages
stand, out clearly in Chart 35. Part of the, fall 'in the ratio for all mort-
gages arose out of the shift from conventional to guaranteed mortgages,
especially in the. firs.t few postwar. years, but the trend was down
within the FHA and conventional mortgage categories, as well.
Repayment. ratios for VA mortgages have been lower than those for
FHA mortgages in all but four years. Conventional mortgage repay-
ment rates have been as much as three times as high as FHA rates. At
least part of the explanation for: this high level rests on the inclusion
of construction loans, which have high turnover 'rates, in conventional
mortgages. Many of these are made by savings and loan associations.43
In their short-term fluctuations, ratios for guaranteed mortgages partly
reflect cycles in construction, particularly the peaks in 1950, 1955,.
and 1959.
Repayment rates can be separated into amortization rates, which
show a smooth and mild downward trend, and prepayrnents, which
show an even sharper decline after 1955 than total repayments. Pre-
payments' are divided by the source into partial and total. It is the
latter, representing transactions associated with refinancing, which ac-
count for this sudden drop from over 14 per cent in 1955 to slightly
over 8 per cent in
There' are some opportunities for testing these findings on what are
at least partly independent data for individual types of financial insti-
tutions. These' estimates, together with some notes on their construc-
tion and their 'many limitations, can be found in' Appendix c.
For'the most part the dat'a for individual institutions,, crude as they
are, support' the findings for total mortgage debt. Repayment rates on
conventional mortgages were higher In every case than those on guaran-
teed ruoTtgages and, with the sole ccnventibnal debt held
by 'mutual savings banks, trends in repayment ratios' were downward
(Chart 36).
data on the relationship between actual and contract lengths of mortgages,
see Morton, 'Urban Mortgage Lending, pp.
See 'I(lãman, Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, pp. 159-163. for a study of
savings and loan association loans. The higher level of repayment ratios for con-
ventional mortgages is confirmed, however, by data for mutual savings banks for
whom temporary construction loans are not important (ibid., p. 155).
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CHART35
EstimatedRepaymentsas Percentage of Mortgage Debt
Outstanding, by Type of Mortgage,
Source: Mortgage debt outstanding is from Kiaman, Vofume .of Mortgage Debt,
Tables 5, 10, 12, and 14. All mortgages, and total
repayments are from Table 88. FHA, VA, and conventional mortgages, total re-






















































































































































Savings and loan association repayment rates for total home mort-
gages, shown here, do not take account of purchases on the open mar-
ket. But data for insured associations, in which repayments are given
directly, confirm both the trend and the fluctuations in this series.
The mortgage investments of life insurance companies are much
more heavily concentrated in guaranteed debt than those of savings and
loan associations. This fact alone is a partial explanation of the lower
repayment rate for total mortgages held by the insurance sector. But it
is not a sufficient explanation because the rate for insurance sector con-
ventional mortgages alone is lower than the total repayment rate for
savings and loan associations. It seems likely that temporary construc-
tion mortgages in the savings and loan sector must partly account for
the high repayment rates there.
Conventional loan repayment rates fluctuated much. more in the
insurance sector than in the. others and in closer conformity with the
rates for other types of mortgages. All three types reached peaks in
repayment rates in 1955 and troughs in 1957. The earlier peak was
scattered, VA loans hitting it in 1950 (VA loan rates before 1950 are
not shown because they fluctuated violently and were probably not
reliable), FHA loans in 1951, and conventional loans in 1952.
The only other major financial sector for which these gross flows are
available is mutual savings banks, and the data are fragmentary. The
decline in repayment ratios is again visible in the total and in VA mort-
gages and, for a few years in FHA mortgages. But it is not at all evident in
conventional mortgages, and it may be that the fall in total repayment
ratios is due more to the shift from conventional to government-insured
mortgages than to the decline within these types. The high repayment
rates for conventional mortgages appear here as in other sectors.
To a considerable extent, the much higher repayment ratio on con-
ventional mortgages must be related to their shorter terms. In 1950, for
example, the median term of both FHA and VA mortgages was twenty
years, while that of conventional first mortgages was only eleven years
and of conventional junior mortgages seven years.44 This fact, however,
affects only amortization, which was never as much as half of total re-
payments and was usually close to one-third. It does not explain at all
the fluctuations in repayment ratios or the sharp decline which took
place in the more recent part of the period.
Some part of the decline in repayment ratios can be ascribed to the
lengthening of mortgage terms. In 1946, for example, FHA mortgages
on new houses insured under Section 203 averaged 21.0 years and those
on existing houses 18.9 years. By 1960 they had reached 29.2 and 25.8
years, respectively.45
"U.S. Census of Housing: 1950, Vol. IV, Part I, p. 42.
45 Reportof Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1961, p. 104.
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